David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10):23-40 (2000)
Discusses the possibility of reconciling different articulations of intentionality from a neurobiological perspective. The author analyzes the relationship between agency and representation and how representation is intrinsically related to action control. The author also presents a new account of action, arguing against what is still commonly held as its proper definition, namely the final outcome of a cascade-like process that starts from the analysis of sensory data, incorporates the result of decision processes, and ends up with responses (actions) to externally-or internally-generated stimuli. The author discusses recent findings from the investigation of neural mechanisms that are at the basis of sensorimotor integration
|Keywords||Action Agency Brain Motor Science Sense|
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Susan Hurley (2008). The Shared Circuits Model (SCM): How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable Imitation, Deliberation, and Mindreading. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.
Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia (2014). Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
Giovanni Pezzulo (2011). Grounding Procedural and Declarative Knowledge in Sensorimotor Anticipation. Mind and Language 26 (1):78-114.
Anezka Kuzmicova (2012). Presence in the Reading of Literary Narrative: A Case for Motor Enactment. Semiotica 2012 (189):23-48.
Omar Lizardo (2007). "Mirror Neurons," Collective Objects and the Problem of Transmission: Reconsidering Stephen Turner's Critique of Practice Theory. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37 (3):319–350.
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