The notion of subjective probability in the work of Ramsey and de Finetti

Theoria 57 (3):239-259 (1991)
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.1991.tb00839.x
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References found in this work BETA
Nils-Eric Sahlin (1990). The Philosophy of F.P. Ramsey. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).

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Citations of this work BETA
Jeffrey Bub (2007). Quantum Probabilities as Degrees of Belief. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):232-254.
Jeffrey Bub (2007). Quantum Probabilities as Degrees of Belief. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):232-254.

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Similar books and articles
Paul Bartha (2004). Countable Additivity and the de Finetti Lottery. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):301-321.
Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1929). Probability and Partial Belief. In Frank Ramsey (ed.), Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press 95-96.
J. Williamson (1999). Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):401-416.

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