David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (1996)
In this original and challenging study, Andre; Gallois proposes and defends a new thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold. His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge
|Keywords||Self-knowledge, Theory of Analysis (Philosophy Philosophy of mind|
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|Call number||BD450.G266 1996|
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Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Boyle (2011). Transparent Self-Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):223-241.
Alex Byrne (2010). Recollection, Perception, Imagination. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):15 - 26.
Jordi Fernandez (2003). Privileged Access Naturalized. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):352-372.
Alex Byrne (2011). Transparency, Belief, Intention. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):201-221.
Markos Valaris (2011). Transparency as Inference: Reply to Alex Byrne. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):319-324.
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