Burge's Defense of Perceptual Content

Abstract
A central question, if not the central question, of philosophy of perception is whether sensory states have a nature similar to thoughts about the world, whether they are essentially representational. According to the content view, at least some of our sensory states are, at their core, representations with contents that are either accurate or inaccurate. Tyler Burge’s Origins of Objectivity is the most sustained and sophisticated defense of the content view to date. His defense of the view is problematic in several ways. The most significant problem is that his approach does not sit well with mainstream perceptual psychology.
Keywords Burge  perception  representation  sensation  Origins of Objectivity  constancy
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PhilPapers Archive Todd Ganson, Burge's Defense of Perceptual Content
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References found in this work BETA
Bill Brewer (2007). Perception and its Objects. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):87-97.
Tyler Burge (2011). Disjunctivism Again. Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):43-80.
Alex Byrne (2009). Experience and Content. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.

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