David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):556-573 (2014)
A central question, if not the central question, of philosophy of perception is whether sensory states have a nature similar to thoughts about the world, whether they are essentially representational. According to the content view, at least some of our sensory states are, at their core, representations with contents that are either accurate or inaccurate. Tyler Burge’s Origins of Objectivity is the most sustained and sophisticated defense of the content view to date. His defense of the view is problematic in several ways. The most significant problem is that his approach does not sit well with mainstream perceptual psychology.
|Keywords||Burge perception representation sensation Origins of Objectivity constancy|
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References found in this work BETA
Bill Brewer (2007). Perception and its Objects. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):87-97.
Tyler Burge (2011). Disjunctivism Again. Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):43-80.
Tyler Burge (2010). Origins of Perception. Disputatio 4 (29):1 - 38.
Alex Byrne (2009). Experience and Content. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.
Peter Carruthers (2006). The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Peter Schulte (forthcoming). Perceptual Representations: A Teleosemantic Answer to the Breadth-of-Application Problem. Biology and Philosophy:1-18.
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