Counterfactuals and preemptive causation

Analysis 56 (4):219–225 (1996)
David Lewis modified his original theory of causation in response to the problem of ‘late preemption’ (see 1973b; 1986b: 193-212). However, as we will see, there is a crucial difference between genuine and preempted causes that Lewis must appeal to if his solution is to work. We argue that once this difference is recognized, an altogether better solution to the preemption problem presents itself
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DOI 10.1111/j.0003-2638.1996.00219.x
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Sungho Choi (2007). Causes and Probability-Raisers of Processes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):81 – 91.

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