David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Analysis 56 (4):219–225 (1996)
David Lewis modified his original theory of causation in response to the problem of ‘late preemption’ (see 1973b; 1986b: 193-212). However, as we will see, there is a crucial difference between genuine and preempted causes that Lewis must appeal to if his solution is to work. We argue that once this difference is recognized, an altogether better solution to the preemption problem presents itself
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Sungho Choi (2007). Causes and Probability-Raisers of Processes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):81 – 91.
Similar books and articles
Murali Ramachandran (1997). A Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Mind 106 (422):263-277.
Peter Menzies (2004). Difference-Making in Context. In J. Collins, N. Hall & L. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. Mit Press.
S. Barker (2003). A Dilemma for the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):62 – 77.
Jonathan Schaffer (2000). Trumping Preemption. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):165-181.
Richard Otte (1987). Indeterminism, Counterfactuals, and Causation. Philosophy of Science 54 (1):45-62.
Alex Byrne & Ned Hall (1998). Against the PCA-Analysis. Analysis 58 (1):38–44.
Paul Noordhof (1999). Probabilistic Causation, Preemption and Counterfactuals. Mind 108 (429):95-125.
Tomasz Bigaj (2012). Causation Without Influence. Erkenntnis 76 (1):1-22.
L. A. Paul (1998). Problems with Late Preemption. Analysis 58 (1):48–53.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads28 ( #71,862 of 1,410,463 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #57,804 of 1,410,463 )
How can I increase my downloads?