Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458 (2008)
|Abstract||Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are sensitive to one of the factors that secure thresholds for outright believing (namely, outright believing that p in a given circumstance requires, at the minimum, that one’s degree of belief that p is high enough for one to be willing to act as if p in the circumstances), we see how pragmatic considerations can be relevant to facts about whether or not an agent is justified in believing that p—but largely as a consequence of the pragmatic constraints on outright believing.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Josefa Toribio (2003). Free Belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):327-36.
Inga Nayding (2011). Conceptual Evidentialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):39-65.
Allen Wood (2008). The Duty to Believe According to the Evidence. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1/3):7 - 24.
Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Andrew Reisner (2009). The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.
Andrew Reisner (2007). Evidentialism and the Numbers Game. Theoria 73 (4):304-316.
Brian Weatherson (2005). Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment? Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.
Ralph Wedgwood (2012). Outright Belief. Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.
T. Dougherty (ed.) (2011). Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads111 ( #4,962 of 550,917 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 550,917 )
How can I increase my downloads?