Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief

Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458 (2008)
Abstract
Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are sensitive to one of the factors that secure thresholds for outright believing (namely, outright believing that p in a given circumstance requires, at the minimum, that one’s degree of belief that p is high enough for one to be willing to act as if p in the circumstances), we see how pragmatic considerations can be relevant to facts about whether or not an agent is justified in believing that p—but largely as a consequence of the pragmatic constraints on outright believing.
Keywords Evidentialism  Belief  Degrees of belief  Justification  Pragmatic  Epistemic constraints
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,404
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (1992). Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.

View all 8 references

Citations of this work BETA
Bruno Whittle (2012). Belief, Information and Reasoning. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):431-446.
Similar books and articles
Josefa Toribio (2003). Free Belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):327-36.
Inga Nayding (2011). Conceptual Evidentialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):39-65.
Allen Wood (2008). The Duty to Believe According to the Evidence. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1/3):7 - 24.
Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder (2014). Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Brian Weatherson (2005). Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment? Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.
Ralph Wedgwood (2012). Outright Belief. Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

124 ( #7,715 of 1,102,989 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

12 ( #16,297 of 1,102,989 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.