Epistemic optimism

Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):333-353 (2008)
Michael Dummett's argument for intuitionism can be criticized for the implicit reliance on the existence of what might be called absolutely undecidable statements. Neil Tennant attacks epistemic optimism, the view that there are no such statements. I expose what seem serious flaws in his attack, and I suggest a way of defending the use of classical logic in arithmetic that circumvents the issue of optimism. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    What's this?
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/nkm043
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References found in this work BETA
Solomon Feferman (1991). Reflecting on Incompleteness. Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1):1-49.
Pavel Hrubeš (2007). A Lower Bound for Intuitionistic Logic. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 146 (1):72-90.

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