Epistemic optimism

Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):333-353 (2008)
Abstract
Michael Dummett's argument for intuitionism can be criticized for the implicit reliance on the existence of what might be called absolutely undecidable statements. Neil Tennant attacks epistemic optimism, the view that there are no such statements. I expose what seem serious flaws in his attack, and I suggest a way of defending the use of classical logic in arithmetic that circumvents the issue of optimism. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    What's this?
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,365
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
John P. Burgess (1984). Dummett's Case for Intuitionism. History and Philosophy of Logic 5 (2):177-194.
Solomon Feferman (1991). Reflecting on Incompleteness. Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1):1-49.
Solomon Feferman (1964). Systems of Predicative Analysis. Journal of Symbolic Logic 29 (1):1-30.

View all 11 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

31 ( #57,204 of 1,102,742 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #182,643 of 1,102,742 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.