Graduate studies at Western
Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):333-353 (2008)
|Abstract||Michael Dummett's argument for intuitionism can be criticized for the implicit reliance on the existence of what might be called absolutely undecidable statements. Neil Tennant attacks epistemic optimism, the view that there are no such statements. I expose what seem serious flaws in his attack, and I suggest a way of defending the use of classical logic in arithmetic that circumvents the issue of optimism. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Mark Walker (2004). Skepticism and Nataturalism: Can Philosophical Skepticisim Be Scientifically Tested? Theoria 70 (1):62-97.
Niko Kolodny (2010). The Explanation of Amour-Propre. Philosophical Review 119 (2):165-200.
Charles McCarty (2008). Intuitionism and Logical Syntax. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):56-77.
Ronald Ortner (2008). Optimism in the Face of Uncertainty Should Be Refutable. Minds and Machines 18 (4):521-526.
John Fox (2008). What is at Issue Between Epistemic and Traditional Accounts of Truth? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):407 – 420.
Charles Vereker (1967). Eighteenth-Century Optimism: A Study of the Interrelations of Moral and Social Theory in English and French Thought Between 1689 and 1789. Liverpool University Press.
Frank S. Robinson (2009). The Case for Rational Optimism. Transaction Publishers.
John A. Howard (ed.) (1973). Causes for Optimism. [Rockford, Ill.,Rockford College Press.
Ludwig Stein (1926). Evolution and Optimism. New York, T. Seltzer.
Markku Roinila (2013). Kant and Leibniz on the Singularity of the Best of All Possible Worlds. In Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Laudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffin (eds.), Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads28 ( #50,058 of 751,991 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #38,076 of 751,991 )
How can I increase my downloads?