Everyday Thinking about Bodily Sensations

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):523-534 (2010)
Abstract
In the opening section of this paper we spell out an account of our na ve view of bodily sensations that is of historical and philosophical significance. This account of our shared view of bodily sensations captures common ground between Descartes, who endorses an error theory regarding our everyday thinking about bodily sensations, and Berkeley, who is more sympathetic with common sense. In the second part of the paper we develop an alternative to this account and discuss what is at stake in deciding between these two ways of understanding our everyday view. In the third and final part of the paper we offer an argument in favour of our alternative
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References found in this work BETA
Todd Ganson (2008). Reid's Rejection of Intentionalism. Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 4:245-263.
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge.

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