David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):377-397 (2011)
The extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that the extended mind hypothesis is born to be wild. It has undeniable and irrepressible tendencies of flouting grounding assumptions of the traditional information-processing paradigm. I present case-studies from social cognition which not only support the extended mind proposal but also bring out its inherent wildness. In particular, I focus on cases of action-understanding and discuss the role of embodied intentionality in the extended mind project. I discuss two theories of action-understanding for exploring the support for the extended mind hypothesis in embodied intersubjective interaction, namely, simulation theory and a non-simulationist perceptual account. I argue that, if the extended mind adopts a simulation theory of action-understanding, it rejects representationalism. If it adopts a non-simulationist perceptual account of action-understanding, it rejects the classical sandwich view of the mind
|Keywords||Extended mind Action-understanding Simulation theory Non-simulationist perceptual theory Embodied intersubjectivity Representationalism Dynamical systems Perception Action Social cognition|
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References found in this work BETA
Andy Clark (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford University Press.
Alva Noë (2005). Action in Perception. The MIT Press.
Anthony Chemero (2011). Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. A Bradford Book.
Evan Thompson (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Harvard University Press.
A. Goldman (2006). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford University Press.
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