Visual Prominence and Representationalism

Philosophical Studies 164 (2):405-418 (2013)
Abstract
A common objection to representationalism is that a representationalist view of phenomenal character cannot accommodate the effects that shifts in covert attention have on visual phenomenology: covert attention can make items more visually prominent than they would otherwise be without altering the content of visual experience. Recent empirical work on attention casts doubt on previous attempts to advance this type of objection to representationalism and it also points the way to an alternative development of the objection.
Keywords Attention  Representationalism  Determinacy of representation  Visual prominence  Intentionalism
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    Ned Block (2010). Attention and Mental Paint1. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.

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