Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
- M. J. García-encinas (2003). A Posteriori Necessity in Singular Causation and the Humean Argument. Dialectica 57 (1):41–55.
Discussion of M. J. García-encinas, A posteriori necessity in singular causation and the Humean argument
Nothing in this forum yet.
Similar books and articles
No categories
Chalmers argues that zombies are possible and that therefore consciousness does not supervene on physical facts, which shows the falsity of materialism. The crucial step in this argument – that zombies are possible – follows from their conceivability and hence depends on assuming that conceivability implies possibility. But while Chalmers’s defense of this assumption – call it the conceivability principle – is the key part of his argument, it has not been well understood. As I see it, Chalmers’s defense of (...)


