A posteriori necessity in singular causation and the Humean argument

Dialectica 57 (1):41–55 (2003)
The absence of a necessary connection in singular causation is a key step in the Humean argument against any form of necessity in causation. I argue that Hume's defence of this step is unsuccessful, and that the step could be skipped, accepting the possibility of necessary a posteriori truths. Still this does not suffice to guarantee a necessary connection in singular causation. Necessary a posteriori truths should be backed by necessary a priori truths. Thus, a main object of this paper is to argue that an a priori philosophical concept of causality involves a necessary connection between its terms
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2003.tb00254.x
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D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.

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