Bivalence and what is said

Dialectica 61 (1):167–190 (2007)
On standard versions of supervaluationism, truth is equated with supertruth, and does not satisfy bivalence: some truth-bearers are neither true nor false. In this paper I want to confront a well-known worry about this, recently put by Wright as follows: ‘The downside . . . rightly emphasized by Williamson . . . is the implicit surrender of the T-scheme’. I will argue that such a cost is not high: independently motivated philosophical distinctions support the surrender of the T- scheme, and suggest acceptable approximations
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01081.x
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Stalnaker (2002). Common Ground. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.

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Citations of this work BETA
Max Kölbel (2008). "True" as Ambiguous. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):359-384.

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