Bivalence and what is said
Dialectica 61 (1):167–190 (2007)
| Abstract | On standard versions of supervaluationism, truth is equated with supertruth, and does not satisfy bivalence: some truth-bearers are neither true nor false. In this paper I want to confront a well-known worry about this, recently put by Wright as follows: ‘The downside . . . rightly emphasized by Williamson . . . is the implicit surrender of the T-scheme’. I will argue that such a cost is not high: independently motivated philosophical distinctions support the surrender of the T- scheme, and suggest acceptable approximations | |||||||||
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Timothy J. Day (1992). Excluded Middle and Bivalence. Erkenntnis 37 (1):93 - 97.
Steven Rieber (2002). A Defense of Indeterminism. Acta Analytica 17 (1):75-82.
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F. J. Pelletier & R. J. Stainton (2003). On 'the Denial of Bivalence is Absurd'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):369 – 382.
Timothy Williamson (2000). Truth, Falsity, and Borderline Cases. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):211-244.
Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe & María Cerezo (forthcoming). Truth and Bivalence in Aristotle. An Investigation Into the Structure of Saying. In N. Öffenberger & A. Vigo (eds.), Iberoamerikanische Beiträge zur modernen Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik. Olms.
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Dan López de Sa (2009). Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):273-282.
Timothy Williamson (1988). Bivalence and Subjunctive Conditionals. Synthese 75 (3):405 - 421.
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