Bermudez on self-consciousness

Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):96-101 (2003)
I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self-consciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self-consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, 'the simple theory', is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self-consciousness and 'I'-thoughts.
Keywords Metaphysics  Self-consciousness  Bermudez, J  Castaneda, H
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00300
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,822
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Sydney Shoemaker (1987). Identity, Cause, and Mind. Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):227-232.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

72 ( #43,141 of 1,724,742 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

19 ( #43,116 of 1,724,742 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.