Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):96-101 (2003)
|Abstract||I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self-consciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self-consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, 'the simple theory', is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self-consciousness and 'I'-thoughts|
|Keywords||Metaphysics Self-consciousness Bermudez, J Castaneda, H|
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