Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
- John Gardner (2011). Can There Be a Written Constitution? In Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law. Oxford University Press.The existence of unwritten constitutions, such as that of the UK, strikes some as puzzling. However the existence of unwritten constitutions turns out to be easier to explain than the existence of written constitutions, such as that of the US. In this paper I explore, and attempt to answer, some tricky conceptual questions thrown up by written constitutions.No categories
Similar books and articles
By analysing original sources and evaluating conceptual frameworks, this book discusses the idea proclaimed in the Preamble to the Constitution that Australia is a federal commonwealth. Taking careful account of the influence which the American, Canadian and Swiss Constitutions had upon the framers of the Australian Constitution, the author shows how the framers wrestled with the problem of integrating federal ideas with inherited British traditions and their own experiences of parliamentary government. In so doing, the book explains how the Constitution came into being in the context of the groundswell of federal ideas then sweeping the English-speaking world. In advancing an original argument about the relationship between the formation of the Constitution, the representative institutions, configurations of power and amending formulas contained therein, fresh light is shed on the terms and structure of the Constitution and a range of problems associated with its interpretation and practical operation are addressed.
Introduction -- Ruling the household -- Humans as political animals -- Slavery -- Wives -- Wealth and the proper aims of ruling the household -- Justice -- Good citizens -- Good constitutions -- Friendship -- The scope and aims of political philosophy -- The best constitution -- The best for most -- The best for each -- The preservation of all and any constitutions and regimes.
The essays in this volume--written by prominent philosophers, political scientists, and legal scholars--address these questions and explore related issues.
Since constitutional arrangements are what make politics work, they are a central concern of political theory._This book, now completely updated, is the first comprehensive exploration of the political theory of constitutions. Jan-Erik Lane begins by examining the origins and history of constitutionalism and answers key questions such as: What is a constitution? Why are there constitutions? From where does constitutionalism originate? How is the constitutional state related to democracy and justice? Constitutions play a major role in domestic and international politics in the early 21st century and an updated version of this classic textbook will introduce students to a number of different areas -- theoretical, empirical, and moral -- which will aid their understanding of this important topic.
We identify and document instances of “occupation constitutions,” those drafted under conditions of foreign military occupation. Not every occupation produces a constitution, and it appears that certain occupying powers have a greater propensity to encourage or force a constitution-writing process. We anticipate ex ante that occupation constitutions should be less enduring, and provide some supportive evidence to this effect. Some occupation constitutions do endure, however, and we conduct a case study of the Japanese Constitution of 1946. We argue that it had a self-enforcing quality that has allowed it to endure un-amended for over six decades. Unlike conventional understandings of that document as an American imposition that imposed foreign values, we argue that Japanese participation in the adoption process, and familiarity with some of the rights provisions that had already appeared in the Meiji Constitution, helped make the document self-enforcing. Most important of all, however, was that it embodied a political bargain that fit the basic cleavages in Japanese society.
When the world is once again preoccupied with constitution-making, this article challenges us to rethink our most basic conceptions regarding the adoption, ratification and amendment of popular-based constitutions. The conventional thought is that written constitutions may only be adopted within a short window of opportunity in the aftermath of a great revolution. Scholars primarily draw on the American and French revolutions of the late 18th century for lessons in successful or failed exercises of popular sovereignty. We further believe that constitution-making entails one document that embodies the will of the sovereign. We hold that the regular organs and tools of government cannot be used in the service of popular-based written constitutions. Only constitutional conventions and special ratification processes may qualify to express the will of a sovereign nation. This article suggests otherwise by drawing on the seemingly opposite experiences of Britain, a State without a codified constitution, and the U.S. According to new findings presented herein, British lawmakers developed a "referendal" model of constitutional transformations based on popular sovereignty, which foreshadowed Ackerman's renowned "dualist" model. The Article analyzes similarities and differences between the two models and assesses their significance for comparative study. In light of the comparison, it asserts that a common Anglo-American evolutionary model for constitutional transformations can be found. It is a model that maintains the distinction between the People and their representatives, yet allows for adoption of constitutional changes in stages, in multiple documents, and even statutes, using the regular mechanisms of government in extraordinary ways, which enable the People's voice to be heard. Its lessons are invaluable to every new exercise of popular sovereignty.
In the 225 years since the United States Constitution was first drafted, no single book has addressed the key questions of what constitutions are designed to do, how they are structured, and why they matter. In From Words to Worlds, constitutional scholar Beau Breslin corrects this glaring oversight, singling out the essential functions that a modern, written constitution must incorporate in order to serve as a nation's fundamental law. Breslin lays out and explains the basic functions of a modern constitution -- including creating a new citizenry, structuring the institutions of government, regulating conflict between layers and branches of government, and limiting the power of the sovereign. He also moves into the esoteric, discussing the theoretical concepts behind the fundamentals of written constitutions and examining in-depth some of the most important constitutional charters from around the world. In assaying how states put the structural ideas into practice, Breslin asks probing questions about why -- and if -- constitutions matter. His answer is a resounding yes. Solidly argued and engagingly written, this comparative study in constitutional thought demonstrates clearly the key components that a state's foundational document must address. In doing so, Breslin draws a critically important distinction between constitutional texts and constitutional practice.
Discussion of John Gardner, Can there be a written constitution?
|
|
There are no threads in this forum |
Nothing in this forum yet.

