David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 100 (2):291-306 (1994)
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) argue that any successful model of cognition must use classical architecture; it must depend upon rule-based processing sensitive to constituent structure. This claim is central to their defense of classical AI against the recent enthusiasm for connectionism. Connectionist nets, they contend, may serve as theories of the implementation of cognition, but never as proper theories of psychology. Connectionist models are doomed to describing the brain at the wrong level, leaving the classical view to account for the mind.This paper considers whether recent results in connectionist research weigh against Fodor and Pylyshyn's thesis. The investigation will force us to develop criteria for determining exactly when a net is capable of systematic processing. Fodor and Pylyshyn clearly intend their thesis to affect the course of research in psychology. I will argue that when systematicity is defined in a way that makes the thesis relevant in this way, the thesis is challenged by recent progress in connectionism
|Keywords||Architecture Cognition Connectionism Epistemology Psychology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Michael V. Antony (1991). Fodor and Pylyshyn on Connectionism. Minds and Machines 1 (3):321-41.
Keith Butler (1993). Connectionism, Classical Cognitivism, and the Relation Between Cognitive and Implementational Levels of Analysis. Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):321-33.
Marcello Guarini (1996). Tensor Products and Split-Level Architecture: Foundational Issues in the Classicism-Connectionism Debate. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):S239-S247.
Robert F. Hadley (1999). Connectionism and Novel Combinations of Skills: Implications for Cognitive Architecture. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 9 (2):197-221.
V. Rantala & Tere Vaden (1997). Minds as Connoting Systems: Logic and the Language of Thought. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 46 (3):315-334.
Jay L. Garfield (1997). Mentalese Not Spoken Here: Computation, Cognition, and Causation. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):413-35.
Brian P. McLaughlin & F. Warfield (1994). The Allure of Connectionism Reexamined. Synthese 101 (3):365-400.
Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1988). Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture. Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
Mark Rowlands (1994). Connectionism and the Language of Thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):485-503.
David J. Chalmers (1993). Connectionism and Compositionality: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn Were Wrong. Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):305-319.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads61 ( #38,840 of 1,699,807 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #53,539 of 1,699,807 )
How can I increase my downloads?