Fregean Sense and the Proper Function of Assertion

Theoria 15 (2):303-316 (2000)
On behalf of Millian views on the meaning of proper names, Mark Textor offers in 'Knowledge Transmission and Linguistic Sense' a suggestive critical discussion of an argument for Fregean views due to Richard Heck (1995). IWhat exactly Heck's argument is, however, is not very clear, as witnessed by Byrne & Thau's (1996) efforts at reconstructing it and Heck's (1996) reply to which is not terribly illuminating. After presenting a form of a Fregean view and a Heckian argument for it, the paper argues that Texror's criticism, as addressed to that argument, is unsuccessful.
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Josep Macià (2004). Proper Names: Ideas and Chains. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):129-155.

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