|Abstract||n this paper I take up these proposals, giving reasons to incorporate semantic features associated with proper names over and above their referent in any (genuine) semantic account of natural language. I also argue that my proposal is compatible with the main points made in Naming and Necessity, by contending that not Millianism but externalism was the claim most forcefully argued for in that impressive piece of work|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Direct Reference in Thought and Speech. Communication and Cognition 26 (1):49-76.
Manuel García-Carpintero (1995). Doubts About Fregean Reference. Philosophical Issues 6:104-112.
Michael McKinsey (2010). Understanding Proper Names. Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (4):325-354.
Eugen Zelenak (2011). On Sense, Reference, and Tone in History. Journal of the Philosophy of History 4 (3-4):354-374.
Edward N. Zalta (2006). Deriving and Validating Kripkean Claims Using the Theory of Abstract Objects. Noûs 40 (4):591–622.
Adam Pautz (2008). An Argument Against Fregean That-Clause Semantics. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):335 - 347.
Jerrold J. Katz (2004). Sense, Reference, and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Manuel García-Carpintero (2006). Two-Dimensionalism: A Neo-Fregean Interpretation. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Jussi Jylkkä (2008). Concepts and Reference: Defending a Dual Theory of Natural Kind Concepts. Dissertation, University of Turku
Manuel García-Carpintero (2000). Fregean Sense and the Proper Function of Assertion. Theoria 15 (2):303-316.
Pieranna Garavaso (2001). Why the New Theorist May Still Need to Explain Cognitive Significance but Not Mind Doing It. Philosophia 28 (1-4):455-465.
Imogen Dickie (2011). How Proper Names Refer. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):43-78.
Added to index2010-11-17
Total downloads16 ( #75,663 of 556,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?