Knowledge and justification of the first principles
In Niels Öffenberger & Alejandro Vigo (eds.), Iberoamerikanische Beiträge zur modernen Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik. Olms (forthcoming)
| Abstract | The claim that knowledge is grounded on a basic, non-inferentially grasped set of principles, which seems to be Aristotle’s view, in contemporary epistemology can be seen as part of a wider foundationalist account. Foundationalists assume that there must be some premise-beliefs at the basis of every felicitous reasoning which cannot be themselves in need of justification and may not be challenged. They provide justification for truths based on these premises, which Aristotle unusually call principles (archái). Can Aristotle be considered a foundationalist? Are his first principles necessary premises to right inferences? We will look at the issue here. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Aristotle foundationalism given | |||||||||
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