Online research in philosophy

The paper explains and differentiates the concept of `fact' in the legal setting. Fact and evidence, fact/falsity distinguished; fact and law considered -- a real difference or a pragmatic device? Questions of fact and degree considered, in themselves and in the context of jury trial and of appeals. Primary fact, factual inferences from primary fact, questions of classification of fact are considered. Whether inference is supported by evidence, and whether classification is correct may be questions of law. Issues of fact and opinion, fact and comment, relative to freedom of speech, defamation etc: no clear distinction available. Legal problems concerning absence of workable distinctions.

This work is a controversial collection of interrelated papers investigating and arguing about issues of concern to lawyers and politicians today. MacCormick combines a scholarly concern with leading thinkers such as John Locke, Lord Stair, Adam Smith and David Hume, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Patrick Atiyah, and stringently argued view of questions of political obligation, civil liberty, and legal rights.

In the first part of this paper, I discuss the different kinds of objectivity; general and legal objectivity more specifically. In the second part, I endeavour to explain the two main views that have been advanced to answer four core questions on legal objectivity. The first is whether moral and legal values are objective. Second, what is the nature of the relationship between legal and moral values? The third is whether, due to the specific nature of law, we should consider a domainspecific conception of objectivity for legal values. The fourth concerns whether there is a correspondence between legal values and legal facts. What is the explanation of the platitudes about the nature of law such as that law is reasongiving, normative or authoritative in character? In other words, do legal facts have a place in our 'disenchanted' or naturalistic (in the scientific sense) understanding of the world. In the final section of this paper, I evaluate naturalism and nonnaturalism in law and consider the future of the debate and its relevance for understanding the connection between law, morality and legal normativity.

Legal argumentation, like argumentation generally, occurs against a background of shared understanding and competence. This view, inspired by Kuhn's understanding of scientific reasoning, is in stark contrast to more traditional ‘rule-following’ accounts of legal argumentation. Below I consider reasons to reject the more traditional view of legal reasoning in favor of a roughly Kuhnian account of legal reasoning and conclude by raising skeptical questions about the cogency of legal reasoning when the tacitly accepted background conditions that make it possible are not critically examined.

This book addresses three major questions about law and legal systems: (1) What are the defining and organizing forms of legal institutions, legal rules, interpretive methodologies, and other legal phenomena? (2) How does frontal and systematic focus on these forms advance understanding of such phenomena? (3) What credit should the functions of forms have when such phenomena serve policy and related purposes, rule of law values, and fundamental political values such as democracy, liberty, and justice? This is the first book that seeks to offer general answers to these questions and thus gives form in the law its due. The answers not only provide articulate conversancy with the subject but also reveal insights into the nature of law itself, the oldest and foremost problem in legal theory and allied subjects.

This paper was presented on October 14, 2008 as part of a panel addressing "The Influence of Perelman in Legal Philosophy" at a conference hosted by the Perelman Center for the Philosophy of Law, Free University of Brussels. I argue that Perelman's philosophy is connected with legal practice, but that he never made the connections between his philosophy and legal education explicit. I refer to the work of Isocrates and Vico, and conclude that Perelman's philosophy can teach us much about contemporary legal education as we strive to address the questions raised by the Carnegie Report.

This paper examines the concept of coherence and its role in legal reasoning. First, it identifies some problem areas confronting coherence theories of legal reasoning about both disputed questions of fact and disputed questions of law. Second, with a view to solving these problems, it proposes a coherence model of legal reasoning. The main tenet of this coherence model is that a belief about the law and the facts under dispute is justified if it is “optimally coherent,” that is, if it is such that an epistemically responsible legal decision-maker would have accepted it as justified by virtue of its coherence in like circumstances. Last, looking beyond the coherence theory, the paper explores the implications of the version of legal coherentism proposed for a general theory of legal reasoning and rationality.

This article identifies four different types of interdisciplinary legal research: one basic and three advanced types. Basic interdisciplinary research uses the same questions as starting points as traditional legal research, however, it also considers other academic disciplines in order to answer these questions. Advanced interdisciplinary research goes further: it can either deal with research questions that are not about the law as such (type 1), or incorporate "scientific methods" into legal thinking (type 2), or combine both (type 3.) This new taxonomy is useful in order to identify the benefits and difficulties of different types of interdisciplinary legal research.

In this essay I start by telling the strange story of a painter and of his picture. The story, I argue, invites questions about artistic space that could be productively asked of 'legal space' too - the space that each legal theory and practice, each time and in different ways, institutes and rules. What, the story asks, is to think legal space? Where do the origins of legal space lie? In short, how is the heartland of legal space? How for example is the heartland of 'contract', 'murder', 'citizenship' or 'war'? Such questions - as it will be apparent to anyone interested in today's most troubling debates over the future of the nation states and of the rule of law - are of considerable importance and should not be ignored by a genuinely imaginative legal scholarship.

This collection of original papers from distinguished legal theorists offers a challenging assessment of the nature and viability of legal positivism, a branch of legal theory which continues to dominate contemporary legal theoretical debates. To what extent is the law adequately described as autonomous? Should law claim autonomy? These and other questions are addressed by the authors in this carefully edited collection, and it will be of interest to all lawyers and scholars interested in legal philosophy and legal theory.