David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):123-34 (1993)
The computational theory of cognition (CTC) holds that the mind is akin to computer software. This article aims to show that CTC is incorrect because it is not able to distinguish the ability to solve a maze from the ability to solve its mirror image. CTC cannot do so because it only individuates brain states up to isomorphism. It is shown that a finer individuation that would distinguish left-handed from right-handed abilities is not compatible with CTC. The view is explored that CTC correctly individuates in an autonomous domain of the mental, leaving discrimination between left and right to some non-cognitive component of psychology such as physiology. I object by showing that the individuation provided by CTC does not properly describe in any domain. An embodied computational taxonomy, rather than software alone, is required for an adequate science of the mind
|Keywords||Cognition Computer Epistemology Mind Science|
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References found in this work BETA
George Lakoff (1987). Women, Fire and Dangerous Thing: What Catergories Reveal About the Mind. University of Chicago Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
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Mark L. Johnson (1987). The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. University of Chicago Press.
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