On the irreducibility of the will

Synthese 86 (3):349 - 360 (1991)
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Abstract

This paper criticizes the thesis that intending to do something is reducible to some combination of beliefs and desires. Against Audi's recent formulation of such a view I offer as counterexample a case wherein an agent who wants and expects to V has not yet decided whether to V and hence does not yet intend to. I try to show that whereas belief that one will V is not necessary for intending to V, as illustrated in cases of desperate attempts to V, one cannot intend to V without preferring to V (rather than not V) and thus one cannot intend to V without, in some sense, wanting to V (at least wanting it in preference to not V-ing). The connection of one's intentions with one's objectives, attempts, plans, and hopes is briefly treated, and some influential work by Davidson is criticized.

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Jhoan garcia
Universidad del Valle

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References found in this work

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.
The origin of our knowledge of right and wrong.Franz Brentano - 1889/1969 - New York,: Humanities Press. Edited by Oskar Kraus & Roderick M. Chisholm.
The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Ethics 98 (1):137-157.

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