Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):96-119 (2000)
|Abstract||This paper attempts in the first instance to clarify the application of the personal/sub-personal distinction to psychoanalysis and to indicate how this issue is related to that of psychoanalysis" epistemology. It is argued that psychoanalysis may be regarded either as a form of personal psychology, or as a form of jointly personal and sub-personal psychology, but not as a form of sub-personal psychology. It is further argued that psychoanalysis indicates a problem with the personal/sub-personal distinction itself as understood by Dennett A revised view of the distinction, which is argued to reflect its true metaphysical significance, is proposed|
|Keywords||Personal Psychoanalysis Science Sub-personal Dennett, D|
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