Selected effects and causal role functions in the brain: the case for an etiological approach to neuroscience

Biology and Philosophy 26 (4):547-565 (2011)
Abstract
Despite the voluminous literature on biological functions produced over the last 40 years, few philosophers have studied the concept of function as it is used in neuroscience. Recently, Craver (forthcoming; also see Craver 2001) defended the causal role theory against the selected effects theory as the most appropriate theory of function for neuroscience. The following argues that though neuroscientists do study causal role functions, the scope of that theory is not as universal as claimed. Despite the strong prima facie superiority of the causal role theory, the selected effects theory (when properly developed) can handle many cases from neuroscience with equal facility. It argues this by presenting a new theory of function that generalizes the notion of a ‘selection process’ to include processes such as neural selection, antibody selection, and some forms of learning—that is, to include structures that have been differentially retained as well as those that have been differentially reproduced. This view, called the generalized selected effects theory of function, will be defended from criticism and distinguished from similar views in the literature
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    References found in this work BETA
    Mark Bedau (1992). Where's the Good in Teleology? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):781-806.
    John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter (1987). Functions. Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):181-196.
    Christopher Boorse (1976). Wright on Functions. Philosophical Review 85 (1):70-86.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Justin Garson (2013). The Functional Sense of Mechanism. Philosophy of Science 80 (3):317-333.
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