Sobre la posibilidad de haber sido otro

Teorema 17 (2):45-58 (1998)
Abstract
The topic of this paper is the conceptual possibility of being someone else. This thought occurs in the first person, and in principle it could be entertained by any subject of experience. The paper will focus on the examination of the content of such a thought: i.e., what exactly is meant by the possibility of being someone else? By way of comparing this thought with other possibilities (e.g., the possibility of being taller), it will be shown that the possibility of being someone else lacks coherence, mainly because it goes against many reasonable and well-established beliefs held about ourselves and our identity.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,304
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Malcolm Budd (2003). The Acquaintance Principle. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (4):386-392.
Lorenzo Casini (2012). Causation. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 27 (2):203-219.
Dietmar von der Pfordten (2009). Absolute Identity/Unity. Review of Metaphysics 62 (4):803-818.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-11-17

Total downloads

4 ( #235,887 of 1,096,371 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #224,935 of 1,096,371 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.