Sobre la posibilidad de haber sido otro

The topic of this paper is the conceptual possibility of being someone else. This thought occurs in the first person, and in principle it could be entertained by any subject of experience. The paper will focus on the examination of the content of such a thought: i.e., what exactly is meant by the possibility of being someone else? By way of comparing this thought with other possibilities (e.g., the possibility of being taller), it will be shown that the possibility of being someone else lacks coherence, mainly because it goes against many reasonable and well-established beliefs held about ourselves and our identity.
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