Searle on Perception

In the course of his discussion of perception, Searle criticizes representative theories in general. In this paper I will argue that, even though his criticisms may be adequate regarding a certain form of these theories, perhaps the most frequently defended by philosophers of perception, a version I will outline here scapes to them. A second issue I raise concerns Searle’s claim that his theory of perception is a form of direct realism. I will raise difficulties for Searle’s attempt to maintain at the same time a “token-reflexive” theory of perception and the thesis of direct realism.
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PhilPapers Archive Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, Searle on Perception
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Garc (1999). Searle on Perception. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):19-41.
Fred Dretske (2003). The Intentionality of Perception. In Barry Smith (ed.), John Searle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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