Supervenience physicalism: Meeting the demands of determination and explanation

Philosophical Papers 34 (2):189-208 (2005)
Abstract
Abstract Non-reductive physicalism is currently the most widely held metaphysic of mind. My aim in this essay is to show that supervenience physicalism?perhaps the most common form of non-reductive physicalism?is not a defensible position. I argue that, in order for any supervenience thesis to ground a legitimate form of physicalism, it must yield the right sort of determination relation between physical and non-physical properties. Then I argue that non-reductionism leaves one without any explanation for the laws that are implied by supervenience theses that deliver this determination relation
Keywords Determination  Explanation  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Supervenience
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References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Robert Francescotti (1998). Defining "Physicalism&Quot;. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (1):51-64.

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