David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Papers 34 (2):189-208 (2005)
Abstract Non-reductive physicalism is currently the most widely held metaphysic of mind. My aim in this essay is to show that supervenience physicalism?perhaps the most common form of non-reductive physicalism?is not a defensible position. I argue that, in order for any supervenience thesis to ground a legitimate form of physicalism, it must yield the right sort of determination relation between physical and non-physical properties. Then I argue that non-reductionism leaves one without any explanation for the laws that are implied by supervenience theses that deliver this determination relation
|Keywords||Determination Explanation Metaphysics Physicalism Supervenience|
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Thomas Nagel (1979/2012). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.
David K. Lewis (1986/2001). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell Publishers.
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Ernest Nagel (1961). The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. Harcourt, Brace & World.
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