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The object of this paper is to present an original classification of ontogenetic reproduction. The main general criterion used is the degree and type of phylogenetic differentiation. In relation to this criterion, criteria are given for the classification of the fundamental types of ontogenetic reproduction and for the classification of the types of ontogenetic generation cycles. Between the fundamental types of ontogenetic reproduction and the types of ontogenetic generation cycles there is a hierarchical relationship which shows that the former are components of the latter. Between the well-defined types of ontogenetic reproduction there exist many intermediate types.
We speak of products in two senses: in one, we speak of types of products, in the other we speak of the particular objects that are instances of those types. I argue that types of products have the same ontological status as that of material stuffs, like water and gold, which have a non-particular level of existence. I also argue that the relationship between types of products and their instances is logically similar to the relation of constitution, which holds between, say, gold and a ring made of gold. In my approach, types of products are concrete entities, having spatiotemporal properties. This picture fits our commonplace conception of types of products better than alternative approaches according to which types of products are universal, abstract, or mereological entities.
This is a review essay of Gardner, John. 2007, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 288 pp.
We use the spaces T n and E n of complete types and of existential types to investigate various notions which appear in the theory of the algebraic structure of models.
Law, unlike morality, is made by someone. So it may, unlike morality, have aims, which are the aims of its makers (either individually or collectively). Not all law has aims, however, because not all law-making is intentional. Customary law is made by convergent actions that are performed without the intention of making law, and so without any further intention to achieve anything by making law, i.e. without any aim. There are also some other modes of accidental law-making. However for the time being we will focus on law that is intentionally made, and therefore is capable of having aims.
Traditional cultural expressions are often unprotectable under existing intellectual property laws. While a sui generis approach may be appropriate for certain types of expressions and/or particular cultural communities, there may be adequate tenets embedded in current intellectual property laws and case law precedent to accommodate the needs of traditional cultures looking to protect their cultural expressions. The range of traditional cultural expressions is such that no one law - be it an existing Western law or sui generis law - will be adequate to address all the different types of cultures and expressions in existence. Case precedent from many jurisdictions and deference to specific tribal and aboriginal preferences will engender the most satisfactory results for these cultures, at least until there is adequate understanding amongst tribes and jurisdictions on an international level to create a sui generis law that is suitable for a majority of situations.
How have legal philosophers systemized law, and what types of assumptions have they made in undertaking this task? In what sense is law a system, and how is it maintained as such? This translation of a French book answers these two core inter-related questions by surveying and analyzing the theories of a number of important European legal philosophers as well as offering its own distinct theory for viewing the law as a system.
There are five basic types of ontology of law identified in relation with the singling out simpIe ontological objects in a strong or weak sense, dualist ontological objects, and complex ontalogical objects in a strong or weak sense. The conceptians of law far mulated in the theories/philosophies/ of law are ascribed to these five types.
Discussion of John Gardner, Some types of law
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