The First Motive to Justice: Hume's Circle Argument Squared

Hume Studies 33 (2):257-288 (2007)
Hume argues that respect for property (“justice”) is a convention-dependent (“artificial”) virtue. He does so by appeal to a principle, derived from his virtue-based approach to ethics, which requires that, for any kind of virtuous action, there be a “first virtuous motive” that is other than a sense of moral duty. It has been objected, however, that in the case of justice (and also in a parallel argument concerning promise-keeping) Hume (i) does not, (ii) should not, and (iii) cannot recognize such a motive. This paper defends Hume’s argument against these three objections.
Keywords Hume  justice  fidelity  artificial  virtue
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI hume200733215
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Rachel Cohon (2006). Hume on Promises and the Peculiar Act of the Mind. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (1):25-45.
J. Salter (2012). Hume and Mutual Advantage. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 11 (3):302-321.
Rosalind Hursthouse (2010). Hume on Justice. In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave Macmillan 264.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

47 ( #72,555 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

11 ( #61,095 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.