David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):21-33 (2013)
Many philosophers believe that agents are self-ruled only when ruled by their (authentic) selves. Though this view is rarely argued for explicitly, one tempting line of thought suggests that self-rule is just obviously equivalent to rule by the self . However, the plausibility of this thought evaporates upon close examination of the logic of ‘self-rule’ and similar reflexives. Moreover, attempts to rescue the account by recasting it in negative terms are unpromising. In light of these problems, this paper instead proposes that agents are self-ruled only when not ruled by others. One reason for favouring this negative social view is its ability to yield plausible conclusions concerning various manipulation cases that are notoriously problematic for nonsocial accounts of self-rule. A second reason is that the account conforms with ordinary usage. It is concluded that self-rule may be best thought of as an essentially social concept.
|Keywords||Self-rule Autonomy Agency Manipulation|
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Garnett (2015). Agency and Inner Freedom. Noûs 50 (1).
Michael Garnett (2014). The Autonomous Life: A Pure Social View. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):143-158.
Michael Garnett (2014). Autonomy as Social Independence: Reply to Weimer. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):155-159.
Chris Mills (2015). The Heteronomy of Choice Architecture. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):495-509.
Kalle Grill (2014). Expanding the Nudge: Designing Choice Contexts and Choice Contents. Rationality, Markets and Morals 5:139-162.
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