Understanding, Integration, and Epistemic Value

Acta Analytica 27 (2):163-181 (2012)
Abstract
Understanding enjoys a special kind of value, one not held by lesser epistemic states such as knowledge and true belief. I explain the value of understanding via a seemingly unrelated topic, the implausibility of veritism. Veritism holds that true belief is the sole ultimate epistemic good and all other epistemic goods derive their value from the epistemic value of true belief. Veritism entails that if you have a true belief that p, you have all the epistemic good qua p. Veritism is a plausible and widely held view; I argue that it is untenable. I argue that integration among beliefs possesses epistemic value independent from the good of true belief, and so has value veritism cannot account for. I argue further that this integration among beliefs comprises the distinctive epistemic value of understanding
Keywords Understanding  Veritism  Epistemic value  Belief  Stroud  Kvanvig
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References found in this work BETA
Catherine Elgin (2009). Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Catherine Elgin (2006). From Knowledge to Understanding. In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. 199--215.
John Greco (1999). Agent Reliabilism. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):273-296.

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