David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 48 (3):130 - 134 (1988)
The thesis that there can be vague objects is the thesis that there can be identity statements which are indeterminate in truth-value (i.e., neither true nor false) as a result of vagueness (as opposed, e.g., to reference-failure), "the singular terms of which do not have their references fixed by vague descriptive means". (if this is "not" what is meant by the thesis that there can be vague objects, it is not clear what "is" meant by it.) the possibility of vague objects should not be taken, in itself, to imply the more radical thesis that the identity relation can be one of "degree". one can hold that the concept of degrees of identity is absurd (how can one thing be more or less identical to another?) "and" that indeterminacy in identity is possible; hence, any incoherence in the idea of degrees of identity does not thereby undermine the idea of indeterminate identity
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Elizabeth Barnes (2010). Ontic Vagueness: A Guide for the Perplexed. Noûs 44 (4):601-627.
Ken Akiba (2004). Vagueness in the World. Noûs 38 (3):407–429.
Ariel Meirav (2009). The Principle of Summation. Erkenntnis 71 (2):175 - 190.
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