Value neutrality and the ranking of opportunity sets

Economics and Philosophy 32 (1):99-119 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I defend the idea that a liberal commitment to value neutrality is best honoured by maintaining a pure cardinality component in our rankings of opportunity or liberty sets. I consider two challenges to this idea. The first holds that cardinality rankings are unnecessary for neutrality, because what is valuable about a set of liberties from a liberal point of view is not its size but rather its variety. The second holds that pure cardinality metrics are insufficient for neutrality, because liberties cannot be individuated into countable entities without presupposing some relevantly partisan evaluative perspective. I argue that a clear understanding of the liberal basis for valuing liberty shows the way to satisfying responses to both challenges.

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-03-09

Downloads
1,298 (#8,005)

6 months
95 (#38,021)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Garnett
King's College London

References found in this work

The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.
The morality of freedom.J. Raz - 1988 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (1):108-109.
Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition.John Rawls - 2005 - Columbia University Press.
An essay on rights.Hillel Steiner - 1994 - Oxford, UK ;: Blackwell.

View all 45 references / Add more references