Why the new theorist may still need to explain cognitive significance but not mind doing it

Philosophia 28 (1-4):455-465 (2001)
In "Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?", Howard Wettstein denies that semantics must account for cognitive significance. He thus rejects Frege's condition of adequacy for semantics and rids the new theorists from seemingly intractable puzzles. In a more recent article, Wettstein claims that not only reference but even cognitive significance is not a matter of how the referent is presented to the mind of the speaker. In this paper, I submit that the crucial element in the debate between new theorists and neo-Fregeans concerning the semantic significance of language is the connection between semantic matters and the human thougth.
Keywords Frege  Cognitive Significance  Howard Wettstein  Philosophy of Language  New theory of reference  Neo-Fregean theory of reference
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DOI 10.1007/BF02379794
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