Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):295-309 (2011)
|Abstract||I argue that fidelity to the context principle requires us to construe reference as a theoretical relation. This point helps us understand the bearing of Putnam's permutation argument on the idea of a systematic theory of meaning. Notwithstanding objections that have been made against Putnam's deployment of that argument, it shows the reference relation to be indeterminate. But since the indeterminacy of reference arises from a metalinguistic perspective, our ability, as object-language speakers, to talk about the ordinary features of our lives is unaffected|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Otávio Bueno (2003). Quine's Double Standard: Undermining the Indispensability Argument Via the Indeterminacy of Reference. Principia 7 (1-2):17-39.
J. Robert G. Williams (2008). Permutations and Foster Problems: Two Puzzles or One? Ratio 21 (1):91–105.
D. C. Smith (2003). What is so Magical About a Theory of Intrinsic Intentionality? Philosophical Papers 32 (1):83-96.
Henry Jackman (1996). Radical Interpretation and the Permutation Principle. Erkenntnis 44 (3):317-326.
Kai Frederick Wehmeier & Peter Schroeder-Heister (2005). Frege's Permutation Argument Revisited. Synthese 147 (1):43 - 61.
Kirk Ludwig (1992). Brains in a Vat, Subjectivity, and the Causal Theory of Reference. Journal of Philosophical Research 17:313-345.
Kent Bach (2006). What Does It Take To Refer? In Ernest Lepore & Barry Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
Anthony L. Brueckner (1986). Brains in a Vat. Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):148-167.
Ilkka Niiniluoto (1997). Reference Invariance and Truthlikeness. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):546-554.
Xiaoqiang Han (2010). There Is No Such Thing as Reference Failure. Abstracta 6 (1):23.
Steven L. Reynolds (2003). The Model Theoretic Argument, Indirect Realism, and the Causal Theory of Reference Objection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):146-154.
Tony Roark (2003). Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof. History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (1):1-14.
Added to index2011-12-13
Total downloads21 ( #65,329 of 722,813 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,813 )
How can I increase my downloads?