David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 11 (2):167-178 (1986)
Rationality in medicine is frequently construed as hypotheticodeductive. This article argues that such a model gives a distorted view of the rational character of an enterprise that makes judgments about individual human well-being. Medicine as a science is a practical human science. Seen as such, its rational orientation is one that applies general knowledge to particular situations. It is argued that such an orientation is not deductive but interpretative. The Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom (‘phron sis’) is used as a model of the rational orientation of clinical judgment. Keywords: clinical judgment, rationality, human sciences CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Kirsti Malterud (2002). Reflexivity and Metapositions: Strategies for Appraisal of Clinical Evidence. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 8 (2):121-126.
James A. Marcum (2012). An Integrated Model of Clinical Reasoning: Dual‐Process Theory of Cognition and Metacognition. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):954-961.
H. D. Braude (2013). Human All Too Human Reasoning: Comparing Clinical and Phenomenological Intuition. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 38 (2):173-189.
A. Singh (2006). Action and Reason in the Theory of Āyurveda. AI and Society 21 (1-2):27-46.
Similar books and articles
R. John Bench (1989). Health Science, Natural Science, and Clinical Knowledge. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14 (2):147-164.
Ineke Widdershoven-Heerding (1987). Medicine as a Form of Practical Understanding. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2 (2).
Kathryn Montgomery Hunter (1989). A Science of Individuals: Medicine and Casuistry. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14 (2):193-212.
Henrik R. Wulff (1986). Rational Diagnosis and Treatment. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 11 (2):123-134.
James H. Moor (1976). Rationality and the Social Sciences. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976:3 - 11.
Franklin G. Miller (1993). The Concept of Medically Indicated Treatment. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 18 (1):91-98.
Edward Hinchman (2013). Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.
Thomas A. Long (1986). Narrative Unity and Clinical Judgment. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 7 (1).
Kathryn Montgomery (2006). How Doctors Think: Clinical Judgment and the Practice of Medicine. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2010-08-16
Total downloads10 ( #312,958 of 1,789,800 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #420,681 of 1,789,800 )
How can I increase my downloads?