Clinical judgment and the rationality of the human sciences

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 11 (2):167-178 (1986)
Abstract
Rationality in medicine is frequently construed as hypotheticodeductive. This article argues that such a model gives a distorted view of the rational character of an enterprise that makes judgments about individual human well-being. Medicine as a science is a practical human science. Seen as such, its rational orientation is one that applies general knowledge to particular situations. It is argued that such an orientation is not deductive but interpretative. The Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom (‘phron sis’) is used as a model of the rational orientation of clinical judgment. Keywords: clinical judgment, rationality, human sciences CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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