Why falsification is the wrong paradigm for evolutionary epistemology: An analysis of Hull's selection theory
Philosophy of Science 60 (4):535-557 (1993)
|Abstract||Contemporary empiricism has attempted to ground its analysis of science in a falsificationism based in selection theory. This paper links these evolutionary epistemologies with commitments to certain epistemological and ontological assumptions found in the later work of K. Popper, D. Campbell, and D. Hull, I argue that their assumptions about the character of contemporary empiricism are part of a shared paradigm of epistemological explanation which results in unresolved tensions within their own projects. I argue further that their claim to be doing a science of science is not defensible. Hull's selectionism is analyzed to show how this epistemological agenda has played itself out in late empiricism. I suggest some directions that Hull might take toward an historical epistemology|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Noretta Koertge (1990). The Function of Credit in Hull's Evolutionary Model of Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:237 - 244.
Kim J. Vicente (2000). Is Science an Evolutionay Process? Evidence From Miscitation of the Scientific Literature. Perspectives on Science 8 (1):53-69.
Michael Ruse (1987). Is Sociobiology a New Paradigm? Philosophy of Science 54 (1):98-104.
M. Coleman (2002). Taking Simmel Seriously in Evolutionary Epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (1):55-74.
David L. Hull (2001). Science and Selection: Essays on Biological Evolution and the Philosophy of Science. Cambridge University Press.
Barbara Gabriella Renzi (2009). A Type Hierarchy of Selection Processes for the Evaluation of Evolutionary Analogies. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (2).
Alex Rosenberg (1992). Selection and Science: Critical Notice of David Hull's Science as a Process. Biology and Philosophy 7 (2):217-228.
Todd Grantham (1994). Does Science Have a “Global Goal?”: A Critique of Hull's View of Conceptual Progress. Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):85-97.
Todd A. Grantham (2000). Evolutionary Epistemology, Social Epistemology, and the Demic Structure of Science. Biology and Philosophy 15 (3).
Ron Amundson & Laurence D. Smith (1984). Clark Hull, Robert Cummins, and Functional Analysis. Philosophy of Science 51 (December):657-666.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #99,484 of 549,065 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,065 )
How can I increase my downloads?