Excerpt from morals by agreement
| Abstract | 'There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.'l But if things considered in themselves are neither good nor bad, if there is no realm of value existing independently of animate beings and their activities, then thought is not the activity that summons value into being. Hume reminds us, 'Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions', and while Hume's dictum has been widely disputed, we shall defend it.2 Desire, not thought, and volition, not 'cognition, are the springs of good and evil. | |||||||||
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John C. Harsanyi (1987). Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, 297 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 3 (02):339-.
Holly Smith (1991). Deriving Morality From Rationality. In Peter Vallentyne (ed.), Contractarianism and Rational choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. Cambridge University Press.
A. T. Nuyen (1984). David Hume on Reason, Passions and Morals. Hume Studies 10 (1):26-45.
Peter Vallentyne (ed.) (1991). Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. Cambridge University Press.
Byeong-Uk Yi (1992). Rationality and the Prisoner's Dilemma in David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. Journal of Philosophy 89 (9):484-495.
David P. Gauthier (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford University Press.
Martin Gunderson (1979). Threats and Coercion. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):247 - 259.
Jenny Teichman (2003). Good for and Good About. Philosophy 78 (1):115-121.
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