Oxford University Press (1996)
|Abstract||This book advances a theory of personal, public and political justification. Drawing on current work in epistemology and cognitive psychology, the work develops a theory of personally justified belief. Building on this account, it advances an account of public justification that is more normative and less "populist" than that of "political liberals." Following the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke and Kant, the work then argues that citizens have conclusive reason to appoint an umpire to resolve disputes arising from inconclusive public justifications. The rule of law, liberal democracy and limited judicial review are defended as elements of a publicly justified umpiring procedure.|
|Keywords||Liberalism Social contract Justification (Theory of knowledge|
|Buy the book||$25.00 used (67% off) $39.99 new (47% off) $70.59 direct from Amazon (6% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||JC574.G38 1996|
|Through your library||Configure|
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