David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 11 (2):215-234 (2008)
In this essay I dispute the widely held view that utility theory and decision theory are formalizations of instrumental rationality. I show that the decision theoretic framework has no deep problems accommodating the ?reasonable? qua a preference to engage in fair cooperation as such. All evaluative criteria relevant to choice can be built into a von Neumann?Morgenstern utility function. I focus on the claim that, while rational choice?driven agents are caught in the Pareto?inferior outcome, reasonable agents could ?solve? the PD and cooperate. Not so, I argue. If reasonable people find themselves in PD situations they too would follow the dominant ?defect? strategy. The difference between instrumentally rational agents and those who are also reasonable is not that they would behave differently in Prisoner?s Dilemmas, but that reasonable people are more successful at avoiding the Prisoner?s Dilemma and tend to play more cooperative games
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References found in this work BETA
S. I. Benn & G. W. Mortimore (eds.) (1976). Rationality and the Social Sciences: Contributions to the Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Gerald F. Gaus (2003). Once More Unto the Breach, My Dear Friends, Once More. Philosophical Studies 116 (2):159-170.
Gerald F. Gaus (2002). Principles, Goals and Symbols: Nozick on Practical Rationality. In David Schmidtz (ed.), Robert Nozick. Cambridge University Press. 105--130.
David P. Gauthier (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford University Press.
Peter J. Hammond (1988). Consequentialist Foundations for Expected Utility. Theory and Decision 25 (1):25-78.
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