T-schema deflationism versus gödel’s first incompleteness theorem

Analysis 61 (270):129–136 (2001)
I define T-schema deflationism as the thesis that a theory of truth for our language can simply take the form of certain instances of Tarski's schema (T). I show that any effective enumeration of these instances will yield as a dividend an effective enumeration of all truths of our language. But that contradicts Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem. So the instances of (T) constituting the T-Schema deflationist's theory of truth are not effectively enumerable, which casts doubt on the idea that the T-schema deflationist in any sense has a theory of truth. (The argument in section 2 of "Semantics for Deflationists" supercedes this paper.)
Keywords Gödel Incompleteness  deflationism
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00282
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Lon Berk (2003). Why the Liar Does Not Matter. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (3):323-341.

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