The legal coordination game
|Abstract||Jeremy Waldron tells us that “the felt need among members of a certain group for a common framework or decision or course of action on some matter, even in the face of disagreement about what the framework, decision or action should be, are the circumstances of politics.”2 Political authority and the law, Waldron insists, presuppose the circumstances of politics. We reasonably disagree not only about conceptions of the good life and value, but about justice and the common good. However, because we need to act together, we cannot rest content with each going his own way. We thus have to deal with the fact that we reasonably disagree while achieving some sort of unity of action. Thus our need for political authority and the rule of law.|
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Added to index2009-01-28
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