What Tipper is Ready for: A Semantics for Incomplete Predicates

Noûs 46 (1):61-85 (2012)
This paper presents a precise semantics for incomplete predicates such as “ready”. Incomplete predicates have distinctive logical properties that a semantic theory needs to accommodate. For instance, “Tipper is ready” logically implies “Tipper is ready for something”, but “Tipper is ready for something” does not imply “Tipper is ready”. It is shown that several approaches to the semantics of incomplete predicates fail to accommodate these logical properties. The account offered here defines contexts as structures containing an element called a proposition set, which contains atomic propositions and negations of atomic propositions. The condition under which “Tipper is ready” is true in a context is defined in terms of the contents of the proposition set for the context. On this account, the content of the context pertinent to a conversation must be determined not by what speakers have in mind but by relations of objective relevance
Keywords incomplete predicates  context-relativity
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00782.x
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References found in this work BETA
Kent Bach (1994). Conversational Impliciture. Mind and Language 9 (2):124-162.
Emma Borg (2004). Minimal Semantics. Oxford University Press.
Jason Stanley (2002). Making It Articulated. Mind and Language 17 (1&2):149–168.
Robert Stalnaker (1973). Presuppositions. Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (4):447 - 457.

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