Priest and Nagel on Being Someone: A Refutation of Physicalism

Heythrop Journal 49 (4):648-651 (2008)
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Physicalism  Subjectivity  Dualism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-2265.2008.00389.x
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