Moral twin earth: The intuitive argument

Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (1):115-124 (2003)
Abstract
Horgan and Timmons have argued that our intuitions about the semantics of non-moral language and moral language differ, and that while twin-earth semantic intuitions generate one result in Putnam´s twater case, moral twin-earth fails to generate comparable results for moral terms. Horgan and Timmon´s conclude from this that the semantic norms governing the use of natural kind terms differ from the semantic norms governing the use of moral terms. I will argue that Horgan and Timmons’ intuitive moral twin-earth argument fails to derail the new moral realism. Further, I will discuss Boyd’s semantic theory and raise problems for it that do not rely on the use of moral twin-earth.
Keywords meta ethics  moral twin earth  intuition
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DOI 10.5840/swphilreview200319112
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