David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Erkenntnis 40 (2):227 - 242 (1994)
The thesis that the necessary and the a priori are extensionally equivalent consists of two independent claims: 1) All a priori truths are necessary and 2) all necessary truths are a priori. In Naming and Necessity1 Saul A. Kripke gives examples of necessary but a posteriori truths, so he disagrees with the second leg of the thesis.2 His examples are of two types; on the one hand statements involving essential properties and on the other hand true identity statements. My concern will be with examples of the second type and whether they refute (2). (2), however, is ambiguous and can mean one of three things: a) If p is a necessary truth, then one can know a priori that p is necessary. b) If p is a necessary truth, then one can know a priori that p. c) If p is a necessary truth, then one can know a priori that p and that p is necessary. Kripke maintains that we know a priori that if an identity statement is true, then it is necessarily true. Consequently, the issue at hand is how we come to know the truth of such identity statements, so it is clearly (b) that we should be concerned with.3 In order to refute (b), and thus (2), we apparently need to show that..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Michael Wreen (1998). Proper Names and the Necessity of Identity Statements. Synthese 114 (2):319-335.
Josep Macià (1998). Does Naming and Necessity Refute Descriptivism? Theoria 13 (3):445-476.
Saul A. Kripke (1971). Identity and Necessity. In Milton K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York University Press. 135-164.
John Turri (2011). Contingent A Priori Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.
Marc Lange & Alexander Rosenberg (2011). Can There Be A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):591 - 599.
Gordon Prescott Barnes (2007). Necessity and Apriority. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):495 - 523.
Robert Stalnaker (2001). On Considering a Possible World as Actual. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (75):141-156.
Thomas Baldwin (2001). On Considering a Possible World as Actual. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):157–174.
Heimir Geirsson (1991). The Contingent a Priori: Kripke's Two Types of Examples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):195 – 205.
Heimir Geirsson (1994). Necessity, Apriority, and True Identity Statements. Erkenntnis 40 (2):227 - 242.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads29 ( #67,941 of 1,413,407 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #154,345 of 1,413,407 )
How can I increase my downloads?