Graduate studies at Western
Faith and Philosophy 10 (3):345-364 (1993)
|Abstract||There exists a diversity of "evidence-free" religions, contradicting one an- other. There will be an epistemic problem for a religious devotee either because evidence-free belief is in general not epistemically justified in the face of diversity, or because of a special problem in the religious case. I argue that in general evidence-free belief is epistemically justified in the face of diversity. Then I argue that recent arguments of Wykstra and Basinger fail to show that there is a special problem in the religious case. Finally, I give reasons why religious belief is epistemically justified in the face of diversity.|
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