The problem of natural evil II: Hybrid replies

Philosophy Compass 4 (3):560-574 (2009)
Abstract
I consider two views that combine different elements of general theistic replies to natural evil, those of Peter van Inwagen and William Hasker. I end with a Hasker-style defense – one that, unlike Hasker's, denies the existence of pointless natural evils – and some brief observations on the direction of future debate.
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Almeida (2011). Theistic Modal Realism. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 3:1-15.
Keith Chrzan (1994). Necessary Gratuitous Evil. Faith and Philosophy 11 (1):134-137.

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