The problem of natural evil I: General theistic replies
Philosophy Compass 4 (3):533-559 (2009)
| Abstract | I examine different strategies involved in stating anti-theistic arguments from natural evil, and consider some theistic replies. There are, traditionally, two main types of arguments from natural evil: those that purport to deduce a contradiction between the existence of natural evil and the existence of God, and those that claim that the existence of certain types or quantities of natural evil significantly lowers the probability that theism is true. After considering peripheral replies, I state four prominent theistic rebutting strategies: skeptical theism; Richard Swinburne's view that moral knowledge entails natural evil; the soul-making theodicy; and the natural law theodicy. | |||||||||
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Scott Sehon (forthcoming). The Problem of Evil: Skeptical Theism Leads to Moral Paralysis. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
T. J. Mawson (2004). The Possibility of a Free-Will Defence for the Problem of Natural Evil. Religious Studies 40 (1):23-42.
Peter Coghlan & Nick Trakakis (2006). Confronting the Horror of Natural Evil: An Exchange Between Peter Coghlan and Nick Trakakis. Sophia 45 (2).
Richard Swinburne (1978). Natural Evil. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (4):295 - 301.
David O'Connor (1995). Hasker on Gratuitous Natural Evil. Faith and Philosophy 12 (3):380-392.
Luke Gelinas (2009). The Problem of Natural Evil II: Hybrid Replies. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):560-574.
Nick Trakakis (2005). Is Theism Capable of Accounting for Any Natural Evil at All? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 57 (1):35 - 66.
Frank J. Murphy (2005). Unknowable Worlds: Solving the Problem of Natural Evil. Religious Studies 41 (3):343-346.
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