A new theory of content I: Basic content [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (6):595 - 620 (1994)
Philosophers of science as divergent as the inductivist Carnap and the deductivist Popper share the notion that the (logical) content of a proposition is given by its consequence class. I claim that this notion of content is (a) unintuitive and (b) inappropriate for many of the formal needs of philosophers of science. The basic problem is that given this notion of content, for any arbitrary p and q, [(p ∨ q)] will count as part of the content of both p and q. In other words, any arbitrary p and q share some common content. This notion of content has disastrous effects on, for instance, Carnap's attempts to explicate the notion of confirmation in terms of probabilistic favorable relevance, and Popper's attempts to define verisimilitude. After briefly reviewing some of the problems of the traditional notion of content I present an alternative notion of (basic) content which (a) better fits our intuitions about content and (b) better serves the formal needs of philosophers of science
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References found in this work BETA
K. R. Popper (1966). Conjectures and Refutations. Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.
Carl Gustav Hempel (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation. In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Free Press 504.
Alfred Tarski (1956). Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Karl R. Popper (1979). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford University Press.
Rudolf Carnap (1937). The Logical Syntax of Language. London, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd..
Citations of this work BETA
Jan Sprenger (2011). Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation. Philosophy Compass 6 (7):497-508.
Gregor Betz (2013). Revamping Hypothetico-Deductivism: A Dialectic Account of Confirmation. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 78 (5):991-1009.
Ken Gemes (2006). Content & Watkins's Account of Natural Axiomatizations. Dialectica 60 (1):85–92.
Ken Gemes (1994). Schurz on Hypothetico-Deductivism. Erkenntnis 41 (2):171 - 181.
Ken Gemes (2006). Bootstrapping and Content Parts. Erkenntnis 64 (3):345 - 370.
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