Verisimilitude and content

Synthese 154 (2):293 - 306 (2007)
Popper’s original definition of verisimilitude in terms of comparisons of truth content and falsity content has known counter-examples. More complicated approaches have met with mixed success. This paper uses a new account of logical content to develop a definition of verisimilitude that is close to Popper’s original account. It is claimed that Popper’s mistake was to couch his account of truth and falsity content in terms of true and false consequences. Comparison to a similar approach by Schurz and Wiengartner show certain advantages of this new approach.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.2307/27653454
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References found in this work BETA
K. R. Popper (1966). Conjectures and Refutations. Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.
David Miller (1974). Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):166-177.
Pavel Tichý (1974). On Popper's Definitions of Verisimilitude. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):155-160.

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